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Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
Balázs Szentes
December 16, 2013
Abstract
This paper analyzes contractual situations between many principals and many agents. The
agents have private information, and the principals take actions. Principals have the ability
to contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts o¤ered by other
principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result
of the paper is a characterization of the allocations that can be implemented as equilibria
in our contracting game. When we restrict attention to exclusive-contracting environment,
our characterization result implies that principals can collude to implement the monopolist
outcome. Finally, in general, equilibrium contracts turn out to be incomplete. That is, a
contract will restrict the action space of a principal but will not necessarily determine a single
action.
1 Introduction
In many settings, rms do not charge a xed price, but instead make their prices explicitly condi-
tional on the prices o¤ered by competitors in an apparent e¤ort to attract customers. They often
commit to price relationship agreements, that is, they adopt policies which are directly linked to
the price policies of other rms. Examples of these policies include meet-the-competition clauses,
price-beating promises and lowest fare guarantees. It is not immediately clear whether these poli-
cies are indeed benecial to consumers, or whether they simply enable collusion between rms. We
are therefore motivated to explore in more general terms the possibility of contracts which depend
on the contracts o¤ered by others.1 Indeed, our goal in this paper is to put forward a general
common-agency model and then explore the consequences of allowing contractibility of contracts.
Department of Economics, London School of Economics.
1Reciprocal trade agreements, such as GATT, also take the form of contractible contracts. A reciprocal contract
commits to setting a low tari¤ against a particular country if that countrys contract does the same. Finally, tax
treaties sometimes have this avor for example, out of state residents who work in Pennsylvania are exempt from
paying Pennsylvania tax as long as they live in a state that has a reciprocal agreement exempting Pennsylvania
residents from state taxes. See http://www.revenue.state.pa.us/revenue/cwp/view.asp?A=238&Q=244681.
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The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we show that by allowing for contractible-
contracts we are able to provide a full characterization of implementable allocations. Indeed,
we prove a folk theorem. The ability to contract on contracts gives principals the opportunity
to collude, and thereby implement a variety of outcomes, as in repeated games. Collusion is
accomplished through contracts which punish a principal if his contract is not the one expected
from him in equilibrium. Since contracts are contractible, a principal is able to commit to punishing
a deviator despite the fact that interactions are not repeated. Our characterization theorem is
presented in greater detail below.
Second, we investigate the implications of our general results when applied to exclusive-contracting
environments (where an agent can sign a contract with only one principal). This type of exclusiv-
ity exists, for example, in the context of employer-worker relationships in which the worker may
accept only one job o¤er, and seller-buyer relationships in which the buyer is interested in purchas-
ing a good or a service from only one seller. If contracts were not contractible, the competition
among principals would result in a Pareto e¢ cient outcome. In contrast, we show that the con-
tractibility of contracts enables principals to collude and e¤ectively act as a monopolist, o¤setting
any e¢ ciency gain generated by competition. Therefore, in such environments, the prohibition of
contracting on contracts emerges as a policy implication.
Third, our theory provides a rationale for the ubiquity of incomplete contracts. A contract
is referred to as incomplete if some terms of the agreement between the principal and the agent
are at the principals discretion even after the contract is signed. In our model, whether or not
we allow for the contractibility of contracts, equilibrium contracts will, in general, be incomplete.
Incomplete contracts are common in many contexts. For example, labor contracts often specify
a xed wage but allow the bonus to be at the employers discretion, adjustable rate mortgages
permit the lender to change the interest rate within pre-specied bounds, and utility and other
long-term service providers may unilaterally raise prices.
In the specic model analyzed in this paper, there are several principals and several agents.
Agents have types, and principals take actions. Each principal wishes to enter into a contractual
relationship with each agent. Following the usual approach in the literature, we analyze equilibria
in communication games. In a communication game, agents are endowed with message spaces,
and the game has three stages. At the rst stage, the principals o¤er contracts to the agents
simultaneously. In our setting, a contract is a mapping from the messages of an agent and contract
proles of the principals to the subsets of the action space of the principal.2 During the second
stage, agents simultaneously send private messages to each principal. In the nal stage, principals
select actions from the subsets of actions determined by both the rst-stage contracts and the
second-stage message proles. Our goal is to characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes of these
2 In existing literature on common agency models it is usually assumed that contracts are complete, that is, they
determine a single action for the principal as opposed to a subset. We show that this assumption results in a loss
of generality.
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games.
Such models give rise to an infinite regress problem, which can make them di¢ cult to solve.
Consider two principals whose payo¤s both depend on the action of the other. Each principals
action is determined by his contract with the agents, so each principal would like to o¤er a con-
tract which is contingent on the contract o¤ered by the other principal. A principals contract
will typically be contingent on the contract of the other principal, which, in turn, is contingent
on the contract of the rst principal, and so on. One possible way of dealing with this hierarchi-
cal dependency is to include self-referential contracts in the contract space. In a self-referential
contract, the action a principal takes will depend on whether the other principal o¤ers the same
self-referential contract. That is, the contract refers to itself. The use of this type of contract
allows us to collapse many statements about higher order dependencies into a single self-referential
statement. However, the construction of a contract space which includes such contracts is not
immediately obvious. Therefore, perhaps the most important feature of a common agency model
is the set of contracts available to the principals. Following the approach of Peters and Szentes
(2012), this paper models the space of contracts with the set of denable correspondences. This
set is a generalization of recursive functions, and will be discussed in detail in the next section. As
will be shown, the key feature of this space is that it includes all sorts of self-referential mappings.
Our main result consists of a folk theorem, which asserts that an allocation can be implemented
as an equilibrium in our contracting game if and only if the allocation is subgame-implementable
and the induced payo¤ of each principal is larger than his minmax value. We shall provide an
explanation for both subgame implementability and the minmax value below. In order to do so,
we rst dene an ordinary contract to be one that does not condition on the contracts of the other
principals.3 Consider a modication of our contracting game in which each principal must o¤er
an ordinary contract at the rst stage. An allocation is called subgame-implementable if it is an
equilibrium outcome in a subgame generated by some ordinary contract prole. Let us now provide
a clear denition of Principal qs minmax value. Suppose that for each j 6= q, Principal js goal
at the rst stage of the ordinary contracting game is to minimize the payo¤ of Principal q. Dene
Principal qs minmax value to be his lowest equilibrium payo¤ in this game. This minmax value is
similar to the standard denition, except for the fact that principals can only punish Principal q in
the contracting stage; each player behaves strategically in the subgame generated by the contract
prole. In that subgame, others can only punish Principal q by playing an equilibrium which makes
him worst o¤.
We characterize the set of subgame-implementable allocations in terms of the preferences of
the agents and the principals. In particular, we show that an allocation is subgame-implementable
only if it is strongly incentive compatible. To explain the notion of strong incentive compatibility,
recall that an allocation in our model is a mapping from the agentstype spaces to action proles
3That is, an ordinary contract is a mapping from the message prole of the agents to the subsets of the action
space of the principal.
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of the principals. Each coordinate of the allocation maps the vector of type proles of the agents to
the action space of a certain principal. Suppose that principals act simultaneously, each o¤ering a
direct mechanism to implement his coordinate of the allocation. An allocation is said to be strongly
incentive compatible if truth-telling by all agents constitutes an equilibrium in the product of these
direct mechanisms. That is, an allocation is strongly incentive compatible if no agent is able to
increase his payo¤ by misreporting his type to the principals. This denition is stronger than the
standard denition of incentive compatibility because, in our setting, agents may report di¤erent
types to di¤erent principals.
The most conceptually challenging aspect of our folk theorem concerns these minmax values.
Since contracts are contractible, one might imagine that the punishment inicted on a deviating
principal might depend on the actual deviation. If punishments could be made contingent on the
deviators contract, then one might suspect that a deviator could be pushed below his minmax
value, perhaps even to his maxmin value. This argument turns out to be false. Despite the
contractibility contracts, punishments can only depend on the deviators identity, and not on
his contract. In other words, when the principals punish a deviator they make use of ordinary
contracts, and do not condition the punishment itself on the other principals contract. This fact
is due to an argument based on mathematical logic stated in Proposition 1.
Finally, in both ordinary and contractible contract settings, we identify equilibrium allocations
which can only be implemented by contract proles which do not pin down single actions for the
principals in the last stage of the game. In this sense, equilibrium contracts are often incomplete.
This is due to the existence of a trade-o¤ between committing to a small set of actions and having
exibility at the last stage of the game. On the one hand, more commitment can increase ex ante
payo¤s. On the other hand, more exibility can deter certain deviations. Indeed, a deviation
might be more attractive if the deviator knows exactly what actions his opponents will take at the
last stage of the game. There is another sense in which restricting attention to complete contracts
results in a loss of generality. We come across allocations which can be supported as an equilibrium
if contracts are required to be complete, but cannot be supported if contracts are allowed to be
incomplete. This is because a principal might protably deviate by o¤ering an incomplete contract,
but there might be no such a deviation in the form of a complete contract. These observations
might provide new insights as to why contracts are often incomplete in the real world.
Literature Review
There is a sizeable applied literature on the theory of price relation agreements. As in our paper,
these papers tend to conclude that price relation agreements facilitate tacit collusion. While we
analyze general principal-agent models, this existing literature focuses only on price competition
among rms. It is typically assumed that the contract of a rm consists of a posted price and a
policy which maps the competitorsposted prices into prices. The actual price paid by a consumer
for a rms product is a function of the rms posted price and the rms policy evaluated at the
othersposted prices, see, for example, Salop (1986), Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Belton (1987),
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Logan and Lutter (1989), Baye and Kovenock (1994), Chen (1995) and Zhang (1995). In other
words, certain parts of the contracts are contractible, i.e. posted prices, but other parts of the
contracts are not contractible, i.e. policies. It is unclear whether the conclusions of this literature
are valid only taking into account these restrictions or whether they can be generalized to arbitrary
contractible contracts. In addition, there are two drawbacks of these contract spaces. First,
such contracts make sense only in the simplest price-setting contexts, and it is not obvious how
they might be adapted to environments where the contractible objects are more complex than
simple prices. Second, these contracts do not accommodate any communication between principals
and agents, and hence cannot be used for screening. Indeed, the agents (buyers) in the models
mentioned above are essentially non-strategic and possess no private information. In contrast, the
contract space in our model is not context-specic, and can handle arbitrarily complex contractible
decisions as well as adverse selection among agents.
In terms of results, our paper generalizes insights from this existing literature to arbitrary
common-agency environments. Indeed, we show that the contractibility of contracts might lead
to a softening of competition, and reduce welfare in an exclusive-contracting environment. In the
context of price-setting, collusive contracts specify high prices if other principals also o¤er collusive
contracts and trigger low prices if a principal deviates. This has a similar avor to the meet-the-
competition clause, which enables a rm to lower its price in response to undercutting by its
competitor. The empirical literature on the meet-the-competition clause is ample and is consistent
with our results. The seminal paper is by Hess and Gerstner (1991) which analyzes the competition
between two large supermarkets, Winn Dixie and Food Lion, in North Carolina. The authors
document that Winn Dixies adoption of the meet-the-competition clause led to coordinated prices
which ultimately reduced consumer welfare. Arbatskaya et al. (2004) analyze the relationship
between prices and advertised price-matching promises of retailers across various industries. The
authors conrm that price-matching promises typically soften competition. Arbatskaya et al.
(2004) draws similar conclusions in the context of tire prices and price-match guarantees advertised
in local newspapers.
Collusion among principals does not emerge as a unique equilibrium in our model. The con-
tractibility of contracts does facilitate collusion, but also allows principals to behave competitively.
In particular, a contract may specify a relatively low price irrespective of the pricing policies of
competitors. An example of such a contract is a price-beating guarantee which strictly undercuts
the prices of competitors. Not surprisingly, most empirical studies nd that such guarantees do
not lead to softening of the competition, see, for example, Arbatskaya et al. (2004, 2006) and
Manez (2006). Whether or not price-relationship contracts across sellers should be prohibited is
subject to ongoing debate. The empirical ndings suggesting that a meet-the-competition clause
softens competition but price-beating promises do not are interpreted as mixed evidence in favor
of making these agreements illegal, see for example Aguzzoni et al. (2012). We adopt a di¤erent
view; we propose that contracting on contracts should be disallowed because it fosters collusion
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among principals, even though it does not necessarily lead to it.
Our paper is also related to the theoretical literature on common agency. Our most important
departure from this literature is the contractibility of contracts. Although the meet-the-competition
example is frequently used as motivation, this literature usually assume that the contracts cannot
be contracted upon directly, but only through the reports of the agents. In order for the agents
to communicate their contracts to the principals, their message spaces must be at least as large
as the space of contracts. Since the contracts are mappings from the message spaces, it is not
straightforward to construct such a message space. Epstein and Peters (1999) show that there exists
a universal message space that is rich enough for agents to communicate their private information as
well as the contracts o¤ered by the principals. They show that any equilibrium in a communication
game with a large enough message space can be implemented as an equilibrium in the game with
the universal message space.4
Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002) show that a version of the Taxation Principle
holds for common agency games. That is, any equilibrium in any communication game can be
implemented as an equilibrium in a game where the principals o¤er menus of ordinary contracts.
An ordinary contract is one which maps reports of types to outcomes. The agent then selects
items from the menu of each principal. One of the shortcomings of the literature is a lack of
characterization of these allocations. Perhaps the main contribution of our paper to this literature
is the full characterization of the equilibrium allocations.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on mutually dependent commitment devices,
see for example Tennenholtz (2004), Kalai et al. (2010) and Peters and Szentes (2012). This
literature considers two-stage games in which players submit commitment devices at the rst stage,
and play a normal form game at the second stage. A players commitment device is a restriction
of his action space as a function of the commitment devices of the other players. Various folk
theorems have been proven in these situations. The equilibrium construction is usually based
on a self-referential commitment device, similar to the concept in our paper. Tennenholtz (2004)
analyzes complete information games and models the commitment device space as the set of Turing
machines. Tennenholtz (2004) proves one direction of a pure-strategy folk theorem. That is, he
shows the implementability of any outcome in which each player receives at least his minmax payo¤.
Kalai et al. (2010) characterizes mixed-strategy equilibria in complete information environments.
Their main theorem states that any correlated outcome of the second-stage normal form game can
be implemented by commitment devices in which all playerspayo¤s exceed their minmax payo¤s.
Peters and Szentes (2012) departs from complete information environments and investigates
Bayesian games with commitment devices. As in this paper, Peters and Szentes (2012) models
commitment devices as denable functions, and also show that this space includes self-referential
devices and that a players payo¤ cannot be pushed below his minmax value. In contrast, the
4Calzolari and Pavan (2006) and Yamashita (2010) simplify the universal message space, which makes it possible
to characterize equilibria in special cases.
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problem of competitive screening does not arise in the model of Peters and Szentes (2012) because
they do not have agents. The key trade-o¤ in Peters and Szentes (2012) is related to the information
content of the devices. On the one hand, a player benets from o¤ering type-contingent devices
because di¤erent types prefer to commit to di¤erent actions. On the other hand, a player might
be hurt at the second stage if he reveals too much information through his devices. Therefore,
di¤erent types of players might prefer to o¤er the same device in order to disclose less information.
A players equilibrium devices balance these countervailing incentives and generate a partition
of the players type space. Two di¤erent types of players submit the same device if and only if
they belong to the same partition element. Let us emphasize that no such trade-o¤ is present in
this paper, as the principals have no information to start with. The main result of Peters and
Szentes (2012) states that the set of allocations implementable with their contracting game is the
same as the set of allocations implementable with public message mechanisms. A public message
mechanism is similar to a standard direct mechanism except that messages are publicly observable
and non-participants can arbitrarily restrict their action spaces as a function of othersreports.
2 An Example
The goal of this section is to explain the space of contracts and provide an illustration of our
approach in the context of an oligopoly example.
Suppose there are two rms (1 and 2) and a single consumer. Each rm can produce a particular
good at no cost. The goods are close substitutes but not identical. The consumer has one of two
equally likely types, A and B. The consumers valuations for the goods are summarized in the
following table:
A B
Firm 1 9 8:5
Firm 2 8:5 9
That is, if the consumers type is A, he values Firm 1s good at 9 and Firm 2s good at 8:5. If
his type is B, he values Firm 2s good at 9 and Firm 1s good at 8:5. His marginal value for
a second good is zero. The action space of each rm consists of setting a price from the set
f0; :::; 10g. The rms maximize their prots, and the agent wants to maximize his value for the
good he purchases minus the price. Consider the following game. First, rms submit contracts
simultaneously. A contract species a price as a function of the contract of the other rm and
the message of the consumer. Contracts are publicly observable. Second, the consumer sends
messages to each rm. Finally, the consumer decides which product to buy if any. If the rms
were to set prices simultaneously without being able to contract on contracts, the market prices
and the joint prot would be at most 2. If the rms could collude, they would maximize their joint
prot by setting a price of 9 and the consumer would buy the good from Firm 1 if his type is A
and from Firm 2 if his type is B. Next, we explain the contract space and show that it is possible
7
to implement the collusive outcome with contracts.
We endow each market participant with a formal language. We require each contract o¤ered
by a rm and each message sent by the consumer to be a text written in this language, where a
text is a nite string of symbols. A rms contract gives precise instructions on how to determine
the price as a function of the texts submitted by the rm and the consumer. Below, we construct a
contract for each rm, c1 and c

2, which implements the allocation that maximizes the joint prot.
These contracts will be cross-referential and take the following form
c1 (c2;m) =
8>><>>:
9 if c2 = c2, and m = A
10 if c2 = c2, and m 6= A
0 otherwise,
and c2 (c1;m) =
8>><>>:
9 if c1 = c1, and m = B
10 if c1 = c1, and m 6= B
0 otherwise,
(1)
where c1 and c2 denote the contracts of Firms 1 and 2, respectively, and m is the consumers
message. The contract c1, for example, species a price of 9 if Firm 2s contract is c

2 and the
consumers report is A and a price of 10 if Firm 2s contract is c2 and the consumers report is not
A. If the contract of Firm 2 is di¤erent from c2 then the contract c

1 forces Firm 1 to set a price of
zero. If the rms o¤er c1 and c

2; the best response of the consumer is to report her type truthfully.
Also note that if Firm i o¤ers ci , the best response of Firm j (j 6= i) is to o¤er cj because any other
contract would trigger a price of zero by Firm i. So the contract prole (c1; c

2) indeed implements
an allocation which maximizes the joint prot. The problem is that c1 explicitly depends on c

2
and c2 explicitly depends on c

1. So, the text corresponding to c

1 has to include a description of
the text describing c2, which, in turn, has to include the description of c

1 itself. Below, we explain
how to construct these texts.
We take advantage of the fact that languages can be coded. That is, there exists a bijection
from the set of nite texts into the set of integers, so each text can be coded by a unique integer.
One such mapping is called the Gödel Coding. So, to any text which describes a mapping from
texts to prices there is a corresponding text which describes a mapping from codes of texts into
prices. Since all the codes are integers, this latter text is a description of an arithmetic mapping.
An arithmetic function which can be described in a formal language is called denable. This set
is formally dened in the next section. Since the Gödel Coding can also be described using a text,
we can identify the space of contracts with the set of denable functions from N2 ! f0; :::; 10g,
where the rst argument of these functions is the code for the other rms contract and the second
argument is the code for the message of the consumer. The range for these functions is the set of
prices.5 In what follows, we use Gödel Coding to construct texts corresponding to c1 and c

2 in (1).
Let ['] denote the Gödel code of the text '. Consider the following contract for Firm 1:
cn21 ([c2] ; [m]) =
8>><>>:
9 if [c2] = n2, and [m] = [A]
10 if [c2] = n2, and [m] 6= [A]
0 otherwise.
5 In general, the actions of a principal do not correspond to integers. Then the range of these functions are the
codes of the actions.
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This contract says that if the Gödel code of Firm 2s contract is n2 and the consumer reports type
A, then Firm 1 will set the price at 9. If the Gödel code of Firm 2s contract is n2 but the consumer
does not report type A, then the price will be 10. Otherwise, the price will be zero. Similarly,
dene Firm 2s contract as follows:
cn12 ([c1] ; [m]) =
8>><>>:
9 if [c1] = n1, and [m] = [B]
10 if [c1] = n1, and [m] 6= [B]
0 otherwise.
Notice that if [cn21 ] = n1 and [c
n1
2 ] = n2 then these contracts correspond to c

1 and c

2. Therefore,
we have reduced the problem of constructing cross-referential contracts to nding a solution to the
xed-point problem (n1; n2) = ([c
n2
1 ] ; [c
n1
2 ]).
Before we proceed, we introduce two pieces of notation. First, the function < : > is the Gödel
coding inverse operation. That is, < n > is the text whose Gödel code is n. Second, we shall make
use of free variables to express statements such as x > y in texts. Integers can be substituted
for the free variables in order to make statements about these integers. If  is a text, then (n1;n2)
denotes the same text as , except that if  contained the free variables x or y, then the value of
the free variable x is set to be n1 and the value of the free variable y is set to be n2. For example,
if  x > ythen (3;2) 3 > 2:Now, consider the following two texts:
cx;y1 ([c2] ; [m]) =
8>><>>:
9 if [c2] =

< y >(x;y)

, and [m] = [A]
10 if [c2] =

< y >(x;y)

, and [m] 6= [A]
0 otherwise,
cx;y2 ([c1] ; [m]) =
8>><>>:
9 if [c1] =

< x >(x;y)

, and [m] = [B]
10 if [c1] =

< x >(x;y)

, and [m] 6= [B]
0 otherwise.
These texts are not contracts, because they contain free variables. However, they become contracts
when we evaluate these free variables at any pair of integers. Let 1 and 2 denote the Gödel codes
of these two texts respectively. Then
c
1;2
1 ([c2] ; [m]) =
8>><>>:
9 if [c2] =

< 2 >
(1;2)

, and [m] = [A]
10 if [c2] =

< 2 >
(1;2)

, and [m] 6= [A]
0 otherwise,
(2)
and
c
1;2
2 ([c1] ; [m]) =
8>><>>:
9 if [c1] =

< 1 >
(1;2)

, and [m] = [B]
10 if [c1] =

< 1 >
(1;2)

, and [m] 6= [B]
0 otherwise.
(3)
Recall that 1 is the Gödel of c
x;y
1 , so < 1 >
(1;2) is c1;21 . Similarly, < 2 >
(1;2) is just c1;22 .
Therefore, one can replace < 1 >
(1;2) and < 2 >
(1;2) with c1;21 and c
1;2
2 in (2) and (3)
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and conclude that c1;21 and c
1;2
2 are indeed the cross-referential contracts corresponding to (1).
Whats more, each principals contract is now well-dened: each contract gives precise instructions
as to how the consumers message and the exact content of the other principals contract together
dictate the price that a principal will o¤er.
3 The Model
3.1 The Physical Environment
There are n principals and k agents. Each principal has a nite action space. The set of actions
available to Principal j is Aj = ki=1Aij , where Aij denotes the set of actions of Principal j which
a¤ects the payo¤ of Agent i. Let A and Ai denote nj=1Aj and nj=1Aij , respectively. The nite
type space of Agent i is T i, and T denotes ki=1T i. The joint distribution of types is common
knowledge. The payo¤ to Principal j is given by uj : T  A ! R. The payo¤ to Agent i is
vi : T Ai ! R. Principals and agents all maximize expected utility.
3.2 The Language and the Gödel Coding
We consider a formal language that is su¢ ciently rich to allow its user to state any arithmetic
proposition. This implies that one can express, for example, that there exist Pythagorean triples:
9x; y; z (n  3) (x 6= 0) _ (y 6= 0) _ (z 6= 0) _ (x2 + y2 = z2) :
In addition, statements that involve any nite number of free variables can be expressed. For
example,x < 4is a sentence in our language and the symbol x is a free variable in the statement.
One can substitute any integer into x and then the predicate is either true or false. This particular
sentence is true if x = 1; 2; 3 and false otherwise.
Denition 1 The function f : Nk ! 2N is said to be denable if there exists a rst-order arith-
metic statement, , in k + 1 free variables such that b 2 f (a1; :::; ak) if and only if  (a1; :::; ak; b)
is true.
We provide the formal denition for a rst-order arithmetic statement in the Appendix. The
reader should keep in mind that a correspondence is denable if it can be explained in a language.
To better understand the denition, consider the following correspondence: f (n) = fn; n+ 1g for
all n 2 N. In order to show that this correspondence is denable, we must construct the statement
required by the previous denition. Let
 (x; y)  (y = x) _ (y = x+ 1) .
Notice that for any pair of integers, a and b,  (a; b) is true if and only if b is either a or a + 1.
Therefore, the predicate  indeed denes f .
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Let L be the set of all sentences in our formal language. Each of its elements is a nite string
of symbols. It is well known that one can construct a one-to-one function mapping L ! N. Let
['] be the value this function takes at ' 2 L; and call it the Gödel Code of the text ':
3.3 The contracting game
Each principal o¤ers a contract to each agent. The set of feasible contracts is the set of denable
mappings from Nnk  N ! 2N. The rst nk arguments are the Gödel codes for the principals
contracts. The last argument is the code for the message sent by the agent to whom the contract is
o¤ered. We denote the set of contracts Principal j can o¤er to Agent i by Cij , and set Cj = ki=1Cij ,
C = nj=1Cj . The timing of the game is as follows. Principals simultaneously submit contracts
(c1; : : : ; cn) 2 C. These contracts are publicly observable. Then, agents send messages to the
principals privately. Let mij denote the message sent by Agent i to Principal j. Finally, principals
simultaneously take actions chosen from the subsets of their action spaces determined by the
contracts and messages. That is, Principal j can take action aj =
 
a1j ; :::; a
k
j
 2 Aj only if for all
i = 1; :::; k 
aij
 2 cij  [c1] ; :::; [cn] ; mij ,
where [cq] denotes
 
c1q

; :::;

ckq

for all q = 1; :::; n. In the name of transparency, we will abuse
notation and replace codes with actions, writing cij : Nnk N! 2A
i
j n f;g while still thinking of cij
as a denable function.
These contracts can be implemented by cross-referential menus. The items on a menu of
Principal j o¤ered to Agent i are subsets of Aij . The menu corresponding to the contract c
i
j is
cij
 
[c1] ; :::; [cn] ;

mij

: mij 2 N
	
given c. Agent is report can be interpreted as choice from this
menu.
We restrict attention to pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). That is, the prin-
cipals and agents are required to play a Bayesian equilibrium in every subgame generated by a
contract prole.6 The main result of this paper does not actually depend on the equilibrium
concept, so long as players play some equilibrium in the subgames generated by the rst-stage
contracts. In particular, the set of sequential equilibria would be characterized by essentially the
same constraints.
We also point out that the existence of an equilibrium is only guaranteed if mixed strategies are
allowed at the second and third stages. The restriction to pure strategies is purely for notational
convenience. Allowing for mixed strategies has no substantive consequence on our analysis.
6 In order to guarantee that these subgames exist, one should describe the game such that the types of the agents
are determined only after the contracts are o¤ered by the principals. This way of modeling the game has no strategic
implications but makes our terminology precise.
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4 Equilibrium Characterization
We seek to characterize the set of allocations which can be implemented as PBE of the contracting
game. A deterministic allocation is a mapping from the type prole of the agents to the action
proles of the principals. Our strategy is to rst analyze equilibria in games where contracts are
observable but not contractible. We call these games ordinary contracting games. The analysis of
these games leads to a full characterization of the contractible contracting games. However, these
games are interesting in their own right. In fact, these are the communication games analyzed in
the common agency literature. In addition, we aim to identify environments where the ability to
contract on contracts can lead to ine¢ ciency. In order to do so, we have to characterize the set of
equilibria in the ordinary contracting games.
4.1 Ordinary Contracting Games
The set of ordinary contracts is the set of denable mappings from N! 2N. The domain of these
functions are the Gödel codes of the messages sent by the agent to whom the contract is o¤ered.
Let Dij denote the set of contracts Principal j can o¤er to Agent i, and let Dj = ki=1Dij and D =
nj=1Dj . The timing of the ordinary contracting game is as follows. Principals simultaneously select
contracts (d1; : : : ; dn) 2 D. These contracts are publicly observable. Then, agents send messages
to the principals privately,

m1; :::;mk
	  Nk. Finally, principals take actions simultaneously,
such that Principal j can take action aj =
 
a1j ; :::; a
k
j
 2 Aj if
aij
 2 dij  mij
for all i = 1; :::; k. Again, for simplicity we use actions of the principals instead of their codes
and write dij : N ! 2Aj while still thinking of dij as a denable function. We restrict attention to
pure-strategy PBE of this game.
We characterize the equilibria in these games by describing the best-response constraints of
the principals and the agents. Notice that when an agent decides what messages to send to the
principals, he knows his type and already observed the contract prole of the principals. Hence, the
messages of the agents are functions of these two objects. Let i : T iD ! Ln denote the strategy
of Agent i, and let ij denote the jth coordinate of 
i, that is, the message sent to Principal j by
Agents i. Let j denote the messages received by Principal j, that is,

1j ; :::; 
k
j

. Principal js
action at the last stage of the game can depend on both the rst-stage contract prole and the
messages sent to him by the agents. Let j =
 
1j ; :::; 
k
j

, ij : Lk  D ! Aij for all i, denote
the strategy of the principals at the last stage. Since Principal js action must be consistent with
his contract, ij (mj ; d) 2 dij
 
mij

must hold for all i, mj 2 Lk, and for all d = (dj ; d j) 2 D.
As usual,  j denotes the action prole of principals other than Principal j, and  i denotes the
message prole of agents other than Agent i.
In what follows, we dene PBE in terms of three sets of constraints. The rst constraint
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guarantees that each principal takes an action at the last stage which maximizes his payo¤. For
all j, d 2 D :
j (mj ; d) 2 arg max
aj2dj([mj ])
Et [uj (t; aj ;  j) j d;mj ; ;  j ] ; (4)
for all mj 2 Lk and d 2 D. The expectations are formed according to Bayes Rule if the message
prole sent by the agents, mj , is consistent with their equilibrium behavior. However, PBE imposes
no restriction on the belief of Principal j if mj is o¤ the equilibrium path.7
The second constraint ensures that each agent maximizes his payo¤ by his message in every
subgame generated by a contract prole. For all i, ti 2 T i; and d 2 D,
i
 
ti; d
 2 arg max
mi2Ln
Et i

vi
 
t; i
  
mi;  i

; d
 j d; ti : (5)
The last constraint guarantees that no principal wants to deviate from his equilibrium contract
in the rst stage of the game. Let (d1; :::; d

n) = d
 denote the equilibrium contract prole. Then,
for all j:
dj 2 arg max
dj2Dj
Et
 
uj
 
t; 
 
;
 
dj ; d

 j

. (6)
We are ready to dene PBE as follows:
Denition 2 The strategy prole (d; ; ) constitutes a PBE in the Ordinary Contracting Game
if and only if (4), (5), and (6) are satised.
It turns out to be useful to dene the set of those allocations that can be implemented in
a subgame generated by some ordinary contract prole. To this end, let d denote the set of
those (; ) pairs for which both (4) and (5) are satised. Then the set of allocations that can be
implemented in some subgame is dened as follows:
A = g : T ! A : 9d 2 D; 9 (; ) 2 d s.t. g (t) =  ( (t; d) ; d)	 .
We refer to A as the set of subgame-imlementable allocations. Next, we characterize this set in
terms of the preferences of the agents and the principals.
First, we x an allocation g and explore the implications of g 2 A for the preferences of the
agents. Let (; ) 2 d for some d 2 D such that g (t)   ( (t; d) ; d). Consider Agent i with
type ti and x an arbitrary vector
 
ti1; :::; t
i
n
 2  T in. Then, by (5), Agent i is better o¤ sending
the message prole i
 
ti; d

as opposed to ij
 
tij ; d

to each Principal j. This implies
Et i

vi
 
t;
 
gi
 
ti; t i
 j ti  Et i vi  t;  gi1  ti1; t i ; :::; gin  tin; t i j ti . (7)
Indeed, the left-hand side of this inequality is the expected payo¤ of Agent i conditional on ti in
the subgame generated by d and given (; ). The right-hand side is the expected payo¤ of Agent
i conditional on ti if he deviates and sends message ij
 
tij ; d

to Principal j instead of ij
 
ti; d

.
The inequality (7) motivates the following
7A stronger equilibrium renement concept imposes restrictions on the beliefs according to which the expectations
are formed in (4), but has no other impact on our characterization result.
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Denition 3 Let gij : T ! Aij for all j = 1; :::; n, i = 1; :::; k and let gi =
 
gi1; :::; g
i
n

. Then the
allocation g =
 
g1; :::; gk

is called strongly incentive compatible if for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, ti 2 T i,
and
 
ti1; :::; t
i
n
 2  T in the inequality (7) is satised.
This denition is simply the standard notion of incentive compatibility extended to a multi-
principal setting. Indeed, this denition would coincide with the standard denition if the inequal-
ity (7) were required to hold only for those type vectors,
 
ti1; :::t
i
n
 2  T in, where ti1 = ti2 = ::: = tin.
Such a constraint would require that no agent be able to benet from mimicking another of his
type. In our multi-principal model, however, we must take more complex deviations into account.
In particular, the messages of the agents are private, and therefore, an agent may report di¤erent
types to di¤erent principals. Of course, any strongly incentive compatible allocation will also be
incentive compatible. The following example shows that the converse is not true.
Example 1. Suppose that n = 2, k = 1, and A1 = A2 = fa1; a2g. The agent has two equally
likely types, T = f1; 2g. The payo¤s to the agent are described by the following matrix:
a1 a2
a1 0 1
a2 1 0
.
The allocation g, dened by g (t) = (at; at) for t = 1; 2, is obviously incentive compatible but not
strongly incentive compatible.
Next, we turn our attention to the principals. In the subgame generated by the contract prole
d, Agents with di¤erent types might send the same message to Principal j. The reporting strategy
of Agent i generates a partition on T i denoted by  ij : T
i ! 2T in f;g.8 Let  j denote ni=1 ij .
After receiving the messages, Principal j learns only  j (t) but not t. Since the action of Principal
j can depend only on information he knows, the strategy prole (; ) implements the allocation
g only if the function gj (t) is measurable with respect to  j , that is, gj (t) = gj (t0) whenever
 j (t) =  j (t
0). In addition, the action of Principal j must be consistent with his contract, that is,
ij
 
mij ; d
 2 dij  mij. As a consequence, the set dij  ij (ti; d) must contain gij  ti; t i for all
t i 2 T i. Therefore, an implication of (4) is that
gj (t) 2 arg max
aij2fgij(ti;t i) : t i2T ig
Et [uj (t; aj ; g j (t)) j  j (t)] : (8)
To summarize, we have argued that if g 2 A then g is strongly incentive compatible, and there
is a partition of the type space for which (8) holds. Next, we show that the converse is also true.
The following lemma fully characterizes the set of subgame-implementable allocations.
Lemma 1 The allocation g : T ! A is an element of A if and only if
(i) g is strongly incentive compatible and
(ii) there exists a partition,  ij : T
i ! 2T in f;g for all (i; j) such that gj is  j-measurable and
(8) is satised for all j = 1; :::; n.
8That is,  ij
 
ti1

=  ij
 
ti2

if and only if ij
 
ti1; d

= ij
 
ti2; d

.
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Proof. The only if part of the proof is already established in the text. To prove the if
part, suppose that (i) and (ii) are satised. Consider the following contract o¤ered to Agent i by
Principal j:
dij
 
mij

=
( 
gij
 
ti; t i

: t i 2 T i	 if mij =  ij  ti 9 and
aij otherwise,
where aij is an arbitrary element of A
i
j . By (ii), the function gj is measurable with respect to  j , so
this contract is well-dened. Since the allocation g is strongly incentive compatible, truth-telling
by the agents constitutes an equilibrium in the subgame. (That is, mji
 
ti; d

=  ij
 
ti

for all i,
ti and j is an equilibrium.) Finally, by (8), Principal j optimally chooses action gj (t) if the type
prole of the agents is t. This equilibrium obviously implements g.
In the case with a single agent, the contracts constructed in the proof of the previous lemma
determine single actions for the principals as a function of the agents message prole. In the
subgames generated by these contracts, the principals do not make any decisions, and hence, part
(ii) is always satised. Therefore, we claim the following
Remark 1 Suppose that k = 1. Then the allocation g : T ! A is an element of A if and only if
g is strongly incentive compatible.
We further investigate the properties of equilibria of the ordinary contracting games in Section
6. Next, however, we use Lemma 1 to characterize the set of equilibria in contractible contracting
games.
4.2 Contractible Contracting Games
This section is devoted to the characterization of the equilibria in the contractible contracting
game. We prove a folk theorem and show that an allocation is implementable if and only if it
subgame-implementable and the payo¤ of each principal is larger than his minmax value, to be
dened later. To see that the allocation must be subgame-implementable, we rst argue that any
contract prole generates an ordinary contract prole. To this end, suppose that (c1; :::; c

n) is an
equilibrium contract prole. For each (j; i), dene dij 2 Dij , such that dij (l) = cij ([c1] ; :::; [cn] ; l)
for all l 2 N and let dj denote
 
d1j ; :::; d
k
j

. Notice that d = (d1; :::; d

n) is an ordinary contract
prole, and the subgame generated by c in the contractible contracting game is the same as the
subgame generated by d in the ordinary contracting game. Since players are required to play an
equilibrium in the subgame generated by the rst-stage contract prole, we can conclude that any
allocation that can be implemented as a PBE in the contractible contracting game must belong
subgame-implementable.
The di¢ cult part of the theorem is to pin down the minmax values of the principals. The
minmax value of Principal j is the lowest possible value that he can get in the ordinary contracting
9To be more precise, mij is a text describing 
i
j
 
ti

.
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game if the goal of the other principals at the rst stage of the game is to minimize his payo¤.
Formally, we shall prove that the minmax value of Principal j; uj , is:
uj = min
d j2D j
max
dj2Dj
min
(;)2(dj;d j)
Et (uj (t;  ()) j (dj ; d j)) . (9)
The meaning of this expression can be explained as follows. All the principals other than Principal
j o¤er ordinary contracts at the rst stage of the game in order to minimize the payo¤ of Principal
j. Principal j also o¤ers an ordinary contract which is a best response to the contracts of the
others. These contracts generate a subgame in which there can be multiple equilibria. In this
subgame, the principals and agents play an equilibrium which is the worst one for Principal j.
The fact that Principal j can only be punished by playing the worst equilibrium in the subgame
is obvious because PBE requires the players to play an equilibrium in any subgame generated by
a contract prole. The nontrivial part of our main result is the rest of the denition of uj . As we
explained at the beginning of this section, the equilibrium contracts and a rst-stage deviation of
Principal j determines an ordinary contract prole. The formula in (9) essentially says that the
ordinary contract prole of the principals other than Principal j does not depend on the deviation
of Principal j, and hence, Principal j can best-respond to it. Since contracts are contractible, the
ordinary contract prole of the principals other than Principal j can depend on the deviation of
Principal j. Therefore, one might conjecture that the principals might be able to push Principal
js value below uj . For example, if Principal j would be restricted to o¤er ordinary contracts then
the others could always o¤er contracts which are contingent on the ordinary contract of Principal
j. Being able to o¤er these contingent contracts, is similar to being able to move after observing
Principal js contract, and hence, his lowest value would be
max
dj2D
min
d j2D j
min
(;)2(dj;d j)
Et (uj (t;  ()) : (dj ; d j)) .
Of course, Principal j is not restricted to o¤er ordinary contracts, and his contract can be contingent
on the contracts o¤ered by the other principals, which are contingent on his contract etc. In fact,
because of this innite regress problem, it is not even clear that the lowest value of Principal j is
well-dened.
Nevertheless, we show that this value is well-dened and, interestingly, the most severe pun-
ishment inicted on Principal j can be assumed to be invariant to his deviation. To be more
specic, Proposition 1 shows that no matter what the contract prole of the principals is, there
always exists an ordinary contract prole d j 2 D j , such that for all dj 2 Dj , there is a way
for Principal j to write a contract so that the generated ordinary contract prole is (dj ; d j). But
then it is without the loss of generality to assume that the principals use the ordinary contract
prole d j to punish Principal j.
We are ready to state our main result formally.
16
Theorem 1 An allocation g : T ! A is implementable as an equilibrium in the contractible
contracting game if and only if (i) g is subgame-implementable, and (ii) for all j 2 f1; :::; ng
Etuj (t; g (t))  uj.
We break the proof of the theorem into two parts. The ifpart is based on the same arguments
as the ones used in the example of Section 2. We shall construct cross-referential contracts which
support the desired allocation. Essentially, the contract of Principal j (for all j) species target
codes, k for each of the other principals. If the Gödel codes of the contracts of Principal q are
the same as his target codes for all q, then Principal j cooperates. If Principal q deviates, and the
codes of his contracts are di¤erent from his target codes, the contract of Principal j prescribes
an ordinary contract which is used to minmax Principal q. The set of equilibrium contracts are
cross-referential because the Gödel codes of Principal js contracts, which we have just described,
are exactly the same as his target codes specied in the contracts of all the other principals.
Recall two pieces of notation from the introduction. First, if l 2 N then < l > denotes the text
whose Gödel code is l. That is, [< l >] = l. Second, for any text ' and (l1; :::; ln), let '(l1;:::;ln)
denote the text where if the letter xq stands for a free variable in ' then xq is substituted for lq in
' for q = 1; :::; n. For example, if ' is x1 < x2; l1 = 1, and l2 = 2 then '(l1;l2) is 1 < 2.10
Consider now the following text in n free variable: < xq >(x1;:::;xn), where q  n. Since the
Gödel coding is a bijection, < lq > is a text for each lq 2 N. Since '(l1;:::;ln) is dened for all '
and (l1; :::; ln) 2 Nn, < lq >(l1;:::;ln) is a text for all (l1; :::; ln) 2 Nn. It is a well-known result in
Mathematical Logic that if f (l1; :::; ln) =

< lq >
(l1;:::;ln)

, then f is a denable function.
Proof of the ifpart of Therorem 1. Since the allocation g is in A there exists an ordinary
contract prole d = (d1; :::; d

n), a strategy prole of the agents, 
 =

1; :::; k

, a third-stage
strategy prole of the principals,  = (1; :::; 

n), such that g (t) = 
 ( (t; d) ; d) and both (4)
and (5) are satised, that is, (; ) 2 d . In addition, let dj;q denote the contracts of Principal
j which he uses to minmax Principal q. That is, the contract prole d q;q solves
min
d q2D q
max
dq2Dq
min
(;)2(dq;d q)
Et (uq (t;  ()) : (dq; d q)) . (10)
Let xm =
 
x1m; :::; x
k
m

a vector of free variables for all m = 1; :::; n. Consider the following text of
Principal j, ci;x1;:::;xnj , in nk free variables:
ci;x1;:::;xnj
 
([cl])
n
l=1 ;

mij

=(
dij
 
mij

if jl : 9i s.t. < xil >(x1;:::;xn) 6= cil 	 j 6= 1;
dij;q
 
mij

if

l : 9i s.t. < xil >(x1;:::;xn) 6= cil 	 = fqg ; (11)
10Of course, it is possible that the text ' does not contain some of the symbols fx1; :::; xng. In that case, there is
no substitution for the missing letters in '(l1;:::;ln). For example, if ' is x2 > 2, then '(3;4) is 4 > 2; because
x1 does not appear in '.
17
for all

mij
 2 N. This expression (11) is not a contract, but rather a contract with free variables.
However, cx1;:::;xnj would become a contract if the free variables (x1; :::; xn) are replaced by inte-
gers. Each of these contracts with free variables has a Gödel code, so let ij =
h
ci;x1;:::;xnj
i
and
j =
 
1j ; :::; 
k
j

. The functions
n
c
i;1;:::;n
j
o
i;j
have no free variables, so they constitute a set of
contracts. Notice that
c
i;1;:::;n
j
 
([cl])
n
l=1 ;

mij

(12)
=
(
dij
 
mij

if jl : 9i s.t. < il >(1;:::;m) 6= cil 	 j 6= 1;
dij;q
 
mij

if

l : 9i s.t. < il >(1;:::;m) 6= cil 	 = fqg :
The contract ci;1;:::;nj is denable because d
i
j , d
i
j;q and f (l1; :::; ln) =

< lq >
(l1;:::;ln)

are all
denable. Observe what happens when Principal q o¤ers contract ci;1;:::;nq for all q; i. Principal j
needs to check whether the Gödel code of < iq >
(1;:::;m) is equal to the Gödel code of ci;1;:::;nq .
The integer iq is the Gödel code of the contract with free variables c
i;x1;:::;xn
q . Principal js contract
says to take this contract with the free variables, x the free variables at 1; :::; n (which gives the
contract ci;1;:::;nq ), then evaluate its Gödel code. This is what is to be compared with the Gödel
code of the contract o¤ered by Principal q to Agent i. Of course, if Principal q o¤ers ci;1;:::;nq to
Agent i these are the same. In fact, if Principal q o¤ers ci;1;:::;nq for all (q; i) then Principal j ends
up with the ordinary contract dij according to the rst line of (12). Therefore, if Principal j o¤ers
contract ci;1;:::;nj for all (j; i) then the resulting subgame is generated by the ordinary contract
prole d. Dene the strategies of the agents and the principals as  (; d) and  (; d) : These
strategies obviously support the allocation g. It remains to specify the strategies of the players o¤
the equilibrium path and show that no player can protably deviate.
Next we dene the second-stage strategies of the agents and the third-stage strategies of the
principals o¤ the equilibrium path. It is enough to dene these strategies in subgames which result
from a deviation of a single principal. Suppose that Principal q o¤ers a contract ciq instead of
c
i;1;:::;n
q to Agent i. Let dq () denote cq

[cq] ;
 
c
1;:::;n
j

j 6=q ; 

. As a result of this deviation,
according to the second line of (12), Principal j will end up with the ordinary contracts dj;q for
all j 6= q. Therefore, the subgame resulting from the deviation of Principal q is generated by the
ordinary contract prole d = (dq; d q;q). Dene the strategies of the agents and the principals,
 (d) and  (d), so that the expected payo¤ of Principal q is minimized. That is, ( (d) ;  (d))
solves
min
(;)2d
Et (uq (t;  ()) : d) . (13)
Finally, we argue that neither the principals nor the agents have incentives to deviate from
the equilibrium strategies. First, if Principal j o¤ers contract ci;1;:::;nj for all (j; i), then no
player can protably deviate in the subgame generated by the ordinary contract prole d because
(; ) 2 d . In fact, we have dened the strategies of the players,  (d) and  (d), in any relevant
subgame generated by an ordinary contract prole, d, such that (; ) 2 d. Therefore, we only
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have to show that no principal can protably deviate at the rst stage of the game. Recall that
if Principal q o¤ers the contract ciq instead of c
i;1;:::;n
q for some i, then his payo¤ is (13). Hence,
the maximum payo¤ he can achieve by deviating from his equilibrium contract is
max
dq2Dq
min
(;)2(dq;d q;q)
Et (uq (t;  ()) : (dq; d q;q)) .
By (10), the previous expression can be rewritten as
min
d q2D q
max
dq2Dq
min
(;)2(dq;d q)
Et (uq (t;  ()) : (dq; d q)) = uq.
This implies that Principal q can achieve at most uq by deviating at the rst-stage. Therefore, by
(ii) of the hypothesis of the theorem, no deviation is protable.
Next, we turn our attention to the more di¢ cult only ifpart of the proof. Let Gd denote the
subgame generated by the ordinary contract prole d 2 D.
Denition 4 The subgames Gd and Gd0 (d; d0 2 D) are said to be equivalent, Gd  Gd0 , if the set
of equilibrium outcomes are the same in the two subgames.11
The next proposition states that for all c j 2 C j there exists a d j 2 D j such that for all
dj 2 Dj , Principal j can write a contract so that the subgame generated by the contract prole is
equivalent to G(dj ;d j). That is, no matter what the equilibrium contracts are, there always exists
an ordinary contract prole d j , such that Principal j can induce a subgame G(dj ;d j) for all dj
by an appropriate deviation. This implies that it is without loss of generality to assume that the
contractual punishment for any deviation by Principal j is simply d j . That is, the punishment
does not depend on the deviation itself, only on the identity of the deviator.
To state this result formally, for all c = (c1; :::; cn) 2 C let d (c) 2 D denote the ordinary
contract prole generated by c. That is, dj (c) = cj ([c1] ; :::; [cn]) for all j 2 f1; :::; ng.
Proposition 1 Let c = (c1; :::; c

n) 2 C. Then, for all j there exists a d j 2 D j, such that for
all dj 2 Dj there exists a cj 2 Cj such that G(dj ;d j)  Gd(cj ;c j).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition is key to the only ifpart of the theorem. Since the proof of the proposition is
lengthy and technical, it is relegated to the Appendix. Here, we sketch the proof for the case where
there are two principals and no agents. Since there are no agents, and therefore the restrictions
on the action spaces cannot depend on the messages, a contract of a principal is just a denable
mapping from the codes of the contracts to the subsets of the codes of the action space of the
11Whether or not two subgames are equivalent depends on the particular equilibrium concept. However, it will
become clear from the way this denition is used that our results do not depend on the renement concept.
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principal. Similarly, an ordinary contract is a subset of the codes of the action space of a principal.
For all d1 2 D1, dene
S (d1) = fd2 : 9c1 c1 ([c1] ; [c2]) = d1; c2 ([c1] ; [c2]) = d2g .
That is, S (d1) is the set of those values of d2 for which Principal 1 is able to o¤er a contract
such that the generated subgame is G(d1;d2). The statement of the proposition is equivalent to
\d12D1S (d1) 6= f;g. Suppose by contradiction that \d12D1S (d1) = f;g. This implies that for
all d2 2 D2 there exists a d1 such that d2 =2 S (d1). Therefore, one can construct a function, f
:D2 ! D1, such that d2 =2 S (f (d2)). Since D1 and D2 are nite sets, the function f is denable.12
Consider now the following contract in one free variable:
cx1 ([c2]) = f

c2
h
< x >(x)
i
.
Let  denote the Gödel code of this contract. Then c1 ([c2]) = f (c

2 ([c

1 ])). Notice that, by the
denition of the function f , c2 ([c

1 ]) =2 S (f (c2 ([c1 ]))). Substituting the previous equality into
f (c2 ([c

1 ])) we get
c2 ([c

1 ]) =2 S (c1 ([c])) . (14)
On the other hand, by the denition of S, c2 ([c1]) 2 S (c1 ([c2])) for all c1,c2 . Therefore,
c2 ([c

1 ]) 2 S (c1 ([c2])) . (15)
Of course, (14) and (15) cannot be true simultaneously, and hence, \d12D1S (d1) 6= f;g.
This result is stated in Lemma 3 of Peters and Szentes (2012) for environments where there
are no agents. The di¢ culty of generalizing this argument for the case when there are agents is
that the ordinary contract space of Principal j, Dj , is not nite. Therefore, the function f is not
necessarily denable. The proof in the Appendix takes advantage of the fact that although these
spaces are innite, the range of any ordinary contract is nite.
Proof of the only ifpart of Theorem 1. We have already established in the text before the
statement of the theorem that g is subgame-implementable. We only have to show that the payo¤
of Principal j in every equilibrium is at least uj for all j 2 f1; :::; ng. Suppose that (c1; :::; cn) 2 C
is an equilibrium contract prole. According to Proposition 1 there exists a d0 j 2 D j such that
Principal j can generate a subgame which is equivalent to G(dj ;d0 j) for all dj 2 Dj . Let 
 and
 denote the second-stage equilibrium strategies of the agents and the third-stage equilibrium
strategies of the principals, respectively. Then Principal js equilibrium payo¤ is weakly larger
than
max
dj2Dj
Et
 
uj (t; 
 ()) j  dj ; d0 j  max
dj2Dj
min
(;)2(dj;d
0 j)
Et
 
uj (t;  ()) j
 
dj ; d
0
 j

 min
d j2D i
max
dj2Dj
min
(;)2(dj;d j)
Et (uj (t;  ()) j (dj ; d j)) = uj .
12The sets D1 and D2 are nite because there are no agents. Therefore an ordinary contract is a restriction on
the action space. There are only nitely many such restrictions because the action space of each principal is nite.
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Note that a principal can o¤er contracts which do not vary with the contracts of the other
principals even in the contractible contracting game. These contracts are e¤ectively ordinary
contracts. In fact, if each Principal q (6= j) o¤ers ordinary contracts then the best response of
Principal j is also to o¤er ordinary contracts. Hence, the ability to contract on contracts expands
the set of implementable allocations.
Remark 2 The set of implementable allocations in the contractible contracting game is larger than
in the ordinary contracting game.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Section 5 describes an environment where the set of allocations implementable by the con-
tractible contracting game is strictly larger than the set of allocations implementable by ordinary
contracts (see Proposition 3).
4.3 The Minmax Values in Special Cases
Whether an allocation is subgame-implementable only depends on the preferences of the principals
and the agents. Hence part (i) of the statement of Theorem 1 is a property of an allocation which
depends only on the physical environment. However, the minmax values of the principals are
dened in terms of equilibria in subgames of the ordinary contracting game. It is desirable to
characterize even these minmax values in terms of the physical environment. Next, we show that
one additional assumption leads to such a characterization.
Assumption 1. For all j there exist aj 2 Aj , a j;j 2 A j ; and Uj : T ! R such that
(i) uj (t; aj ; a j)  Uj (t) for all a j 2 A j ; and
(ii) uj (t; aj ; a j;j)  Uj (t) for all aj 2 Aj :
This assumption is satised in many important economic applications. The action aj can
often be thought of as a default action of Principal j which allows him not to participate in the
interaction with the agents. If the principals are sellers and the agents are buyers then aj means
that Principal j does not sell his products. If the principals are employers and the agents are
workers then this action corresponds to the choice of not employing any worker. The action prole
a j;j can be interpreted as an action prole of the principals (other than Principal j) which excludes
Principal j from participation. In the buyer-seller example, this can be accomplished by setting
prices so low that Principal j cannot make a positive prot by selling his products. Similarly,
in the employer-worker example, the principals can set wages higher than the productivity of the
workers.
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satised for the mappings Uj for all j 2 f1; :::; ng.
Then the allocation g : T ! A is implementable as an equilibrium in the contractible contracting
game if and only if (i) g 2 A, and (ii) Etuj (t; g (t))  EtUj (t) for all j 2 f1; :::; ng.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Next, we show that if information is complete, our Theorem 1 also leads to a characterization of
the equilibria in terms of the physical environment without any reference to ordinary contracting
games.
Theorem 3 Suppose that jT ij = 1 for all i. Then the allocation (a1; :::; an) = a 2 A is imple-
mentable as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if
uj (a
)  min
a i
max
ai
uj (ai; a i) = uj . (16)
A notable feature of this corollary is that whether or not an allocation is implementable does
not depend on the number or preferences of the agents.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5 Application to Exclusive Contracting: Welfare and Policy
Implications
Arguably, in many real-life applications of common-agency models, an agent signs a contracts with
only one of the principals. Examples include employer-worker relationships in which the worker
can accept only one job o¤er, and seller-buyer relationships in which the buyer is interested in
purchasing a good or a service from only one seller. In this section we consider such environments,
which we refer to as exclusive-contracting environments (formally dened below).
We begin by showing that, in exclusive-contracting environments, strong incentive compatibility
coincides with the standard notion of incentive compatibility. We prove that any allocation which is
incentive compatible and individually rational can be implemented in the contractible contracting
game. We next direct our attention to settings in which the principals have identical action spaces
and identical payo¤ functions. In the buyer-seller example, this implies that the sellersproducts are
perfect substitutes from the agents point of view, and that all sellers have the same production
costs. We refer to this quite naturally as a perfectly competitive environment. By restricting
attention to perfectly competitive, exclusive-contracting environments, we are able to dene and
compare monopolist and competitive allocations. Indeed, as both the action spaces and payo¤s are
identical across principals, simply varying the number of principals becomes a meaningful exercise.
We show that if there is more than one principal and contracts are not contractible, then every
equilibrium outcome is Pareto e¢ cient. However, if contracts are allowed to be contractible, any
e¢ ciency gain generated by the competition may disappear due to collusion between principals. In
fact, through collusion, principals are even able to implement the monopolist outcome. Therefore,
as a policy implication, our results suggest the prohibition of contracting on contracts in this type
of environment.
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Exclusive Contracting. There are many principals (n > 1) and a single agent (k = 1). The
nite type space of the agent is T . If Principal j (= 1; :::; n) and the agent enter into a contractual
relationship, the possible agreements between them can be described by the set X  P , where
X is a nite set of contractible decisions and P  R is a nite set of transfers.13 Contracting is
exclusive: the agent can enter into a contractual agreement with only one principal. We emphasize
that this exclusivity assumption still allows for the terms of a principals contract to depend on
the contracts of the other principals. If the agent with type t signs a contract with Principal j and
the contract species (xj ; pj) 2 X  P , then the payo¤s to the agent and Principal j are
V (t; xj)  pj and Uj (t; xj) + pj ;
respectively. The agents outside option is normalized to be zero. That is, if the agent chooses not
to sign a contract he receives a payo¤ of zero. Similarly, if Principal js contract is not signed by
the agent, she receives a payo¤ of zero.
In order to simplify the discussion of the principalsand the agents outside options, we assume
that 0 2 X \ P for all j = 1; :::; n and V (t; 0) = Uj (t; 0) = 0 for all t 2 T . As a consequence,
it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to allocations in which the agent chooses
to participate, and signs a contract with a principal. Formally, an allocation in the exclusive-
contracting environment is a triple, (x;p;n), x : T ! X; p : T ! P , n : T ! f1; :::; ng such that
V (t;x (t))   p (t)  0 for all t 2 T . The interpretation of this triple is as follows: the agent with
type t contracts with Principal n (t) and the payo¤s are determined by the decision-transfer pair
(x (t) ;p (t)).
This model has various possible interpretations. For example, one might think of the agent
as a buyer and the principals as sellers. The agents type is his valuation, xj is the quality (or
quantity) of the principals product, and pj is the price. If instead, the agent is a worker and the
principals are employers, then the pair (xj ; pj) is a labor contract where pj is the wage and xj
species other characteristics of the job such as working hours, the number of vacation days, or
health insurance benets. A workers type might correspond to his productivity, or his taste for
various characteristics of the job. As a third example, suppose the agent is an economic consultant
and the principals are competing rms in a certain industry. The type of the consultant is his
industry experience, and the contractible decision is the deadline by which the consultant must
complete the project. Of course, many other sensible interpretations exist.
Transformation. The exclusive-contracting environment di¤ers from the original model in
Section 3 in two ways. First, in our original model, the agent entered into a contractual agreement
with each principal, while in the exclusive-contracting environment the agent must choose a single
principal. Second, in the original model, payo¤s are dened as a function of the action proles
of the principals; in the exclusive-contracting environment, payo¤s depend only on the action of
13Note that it is without loss of generality that the set X is the same across principals, because a principals
inability to make a certain decision can be captured by assigning to her a large negative payo¤.
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the principal whose contract is accepted by the agent. Nevertheless, we are able to demonstrate
that an exclusive-contracting environment can be transformed into a strategically equivalent model
which is a special case of our original model. The main idea is to encode the agents choice of
principal into the denition of the payo¤s. To this end, we dene the payo¤s of the principals and
the agent as a function of the agreement proles. In order to be consistent with the notation in
Section 3, let Aj denote X  P for all j = 1; :::; n. If Principal j takes action aj = (xj ; pj), then
the agents payo¤ function, v : T A! R, is dened by
v (t; a) = max

0; max
j2f1;:::;ng
V (t; xj)  pj

. (17)
That is, the agents payo¤ is determined by the agreement o¤ered by whichever principal can make
him best o¤, unless he opts out and receives his reservation value, which is zero. In order to resolve
ties, we assume that if V (t; xj)   pj = V (t; xq)   pq and j < q then the agent strictly prefers
(xj ; pj) to (xq; pq). The payo¤ to Principal j is dened as follows:
uj (t; a) =
(
u (xj) + pj if j = min argmaxq2f1;:::;ng (V (t; xq)  pq) and V (t; xj)  pj  0;
0 otherwise.
A principal is only able to obtain a positive payo¤ if her proposed agreement maximizes the agents
payo¤. In addition, her name must be the rst one listed among those who manage to maximize
the agents payo¤. Let us point out that the payo¤ functions fujgnj=1 and v have the same domain
as those in Section 3. We also note that the agents choice of the principal is encoded in the
denitions of v and fujgn1 . Therefore, the exclusive-contracting environment can indeed be treated
as a special case of our general model.
Next, we characterize the allocations which are implementable by contractible contracting
games.
Denition 5 The allocation (x;p;n) ; x : T ! X; and p : T ! P is incentive compatible and
individually rational if
V (t;x (t))  p (t)  V (t;x (t0))  p (t0) for all t; t0 2 T , (18)
Et (Uj (t;x (t)) + p (t) j n (t) = j)  0 for all j = 1; :::; n. (19)
The inequalities in (18) represent the agents incentive compatibility constraints, and the inequal-
ities in (19) are the principals participation constraints. Recall that the agents participation
constraint is included in the denition of an allocation, that is, V (t;x (t))  p (t)  0 for all t.
In what follows, we assume that the range of transfers is su¢ ciently large, in particular,
V (t; x)  Uj (t; x)   minP for all j; x and t.
Proposition 2 In the contractible contracting game, an allocation can be implemented if and only
if it is incentive compatible and individually rational.
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It is worth comparing the statement of this proposition with those of Theorems 1 and 2. One
notable di¤erence is that, in an exclusive contracting environment, strong incentive compatibility
of an allocation is no longer a requirement for impelementability. Indeed, in the proof we argue
that the set of strong incentive compatible allocations coincides with that of incentive compatible
allocations.
Proof. First, we argue that Assumption 1 holds for the exclusive-contracting environment and
hence, Theorem 2 is applicable. For each j = 1; :::; n and t 2 T; dene Uj (t) to be zero. In addition,
let aj = (0; 0) for all j and a j;j = (0;minP ) for all j. The triple
 fUjgn1 ; fajgn1 ; fa j;jgn1  clearly
satises parts (i) and (ii) of Assumption 1. Therefore, Theorem 2 and Remark 1 imply that an
allocation is implementable if and only if it is strongly incentive compatible and Principal j receives
a payo¤ of at least EtUj (t) for all j 2 f1; :::; ng. Since Uj (t)  0, these latter conditions coincide
with the inequalities in (19). Hence, in order to complete the proof, it remains to show that the
set of strongly incentive compatible allocations, A, is the same as the set of incentive compatible
allocations.
Recall that strong incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility. So, we only need
to show the reverse: that in an exclusive-contracting environment, each incentive compatible al-
location is also strongly incentive compatible. Note that the allocation(x;p;n) in the exclusive
contracting environment corresponds to the allocation g = (g1; :::; gn) : T ! A, such that
gj (t) =
(
(x (t) ;p (t)) if n (t) = j
(0; 0) otherwise.
(20)
According to Denition 3, we need to show that (18) implies that for all t 2 T , and (t1; :::tn) 2
(T )
n
:
v (t; (g (t)))  v (t; (g1 (t1) ; :::; gn (tn))) .
By (17) and (20), this inequality can be rewritten as
V (t;x (t))  p (t)  max
t0
[V (t;x (t0))  p (t0)] ;
which follows from (18).
Perfectly Competitive Environments. Next, let us consider environments in which the princi-
pals compete, that is, each principal receives the same payo¤ when making a particular decision.
To be more specic, we assume that Uj (t; x) = U (x) for all j = 1; :::; n, x 2 X and t 2 T . The
assumption that the principals payo¤ is not directly a¤ected by the agents type is made in order
to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in a competitive screening model, and is satised in
most of the applications mentioned above.14 As is shown below, this requirement enables us to
provide a simple characterization of competitive equilibria.
14Perhaps the most prominent example in which an equilibrium does not exist is the insurance model of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976). For a detailed discussion of equilibrium existence in competitive screeining models, see Chapter
13 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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Consider the problem of a single (monopolist) principal. The monopolist maximizes Et [U (t;x (t)) + p (t)]
subject to (18) and the participation constraint of the agent. We denote the solution to this prob-
lem by (xm (t) ;pm (t)) and refer to it as the monopoly outcome. Since U (0) = 0, the participation
constraint of the principal in (19) is automatically satised at the solution to this maximization
problem. The Pareto Optimal outcome solves the following problem:
max
x
U (x (t)) + V (t;x (t)) for all t 2 T .
Let xc denote the solution.
We assume that the set of transfers, P , is rich enough to implement the Pareto Optimal
outcome. That is, for all t there is a pt 2 P such that V (t;x (t))  pt   U (x (t)). We also
assume that the range for transfers is su¢ ciently large, that is, U (x)+minP < 0 < U (x)+maxP
for all x 2 X. These assumptions are only needed because we are considering a discrete model,
and are satised in the standard continuous version of our environment. Note that (xm;pm) as
well as xc are generically unique.
Proposition 3 Suppose that an exclusive-contracting environment is perfectly competitive. If n >
1, each equilibrium implements xc in the ordinary contracting game. In the contractible contracting
game, there exists an equilibrium which implements xm.
According to this proposition, in perfectly competitive, exclusive environments, the contractibil-
ity of contracts can o¤set any e¢ ciency gain generated by competition among the principals. The
policy implication is that contracting on contracts should be prohibited in these environments.
An implication of this proposition is that the set of implementable allocations in the contractible
contracting game is strictly larger than in the ordinary contracting game. Note that this proposition
can be easily generalized for the case of k (> 1) identical agents as long as the payo¤s of the
principals are additive in the agents. Therefore, we conclude that allowing the contractibility of
contracts might strictly enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes, irrespective of the number of
agents.
Proof. Suppose that contracts are not contractible and, by contradiction, that there exists an
equilibrium and t 2 T such that if the agents type is t, xc (t) is not implemented. Since the agent
prefers to contract with the principal with the smallest name, all but Principal 1 receive a payo¤
of zero, even conditional on the type of the agent. (This is because if the agent accepts Principal
js (j 6= 1) contract then Principal 1 could o¤er the same contract and achieve the same payo¤
as Principal j.) We show that Principal 2 can increase his payo¤ by deviation at the contracting
stage. Consider the following contract: d (l) = (xc (t) ;pc (t)) for all l: By part (i) of Assumption 2,
the agent with type t, and perhaps with other types too, will interact with Principal 2, and hence,
Principal 2 can achieve a positive payo¤. In addition, this payo¤ is strictly positive generically.
Suppose now that contracts are contractible. In order to verify that (xm;pm) is an equilibrium
outcome, dene n (t)  1. We argue that the allocation (xm;pm;n) is incentive compatible
26
and individually rational. First, note that all principals except Principal 1 receive a payo¤ of
zero. Second, Principal 1 receives the monopoly prot which is weakly positive because U (0) =
0. Finally, (xm;pm;n) satisfy both the agents incentive and participation constraints because
(xm;pm) is the solution to the monopolists maximization problem subject to the exact same
constraints. Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that (xm;pm;n) is an equilibrium outcome in the
contractible contracting game.
Next, we show that if the environment is not perfectly competitive, the contractibility of the
contracts can in fact lead to an increase in welfare.
Example 2. Suppose that n = 2, k = 1,X = f0; a; bg and T = f(A;H) ; (A;L) ; (B;H) ; (B;L)g.
We shall interpret this example in the following way: there are two rms (principals) and each of
them is specialized in producing a distinct product: Firm 1 produces good a and Firm 2 produces
good b. The buyers (agents) type is two-dimensional, and he is interested in buying at most one
unit of a good. The rst dimension corresponds to the product the buyer is interested in buying
while the second dimension is his valuation, which is either high (H) or low (L). The following
table describes the utility prole (U1; U2; V ) for each (x; t) 2 X  T :
(A;H) (A;L) (B;H) (B;L)
a 0; 1; H 0; 1; L 0; 1; 0 0; 1; 0
b  1; 0; 0  1; 0; 0  1; 0; H  1; 0; L
;
The rst and second numbers in each cell denote the payo¤s to Principal 1 and Principal 2 respec-
tively, and the third number is the payo¤ to the agent. Note that if the agents type is A (B), his
willingness-to-pay for the other good b (a) is zero, regardless of whether his valuation is high or
low. In this example, U1 and U2 are the principalscosts of production. Note that Principal 1s
(2s) inability to produce good b (a) is captured by assigning to her an innitely large production
cost. Finally, we assume that H > 2L > 0.
Since the buyers willingness-to-pay is positive for one of the goods, the Pareto Optimal outcome
is dened by
(xc (t) ;nc (t)) =
(
(a; 1) if t 2 f(a; L) ; (a;H)g ;
(b; 2) if t 2 f(b; L) ; (b;H)g.
In what follows, we show that the Pareto Optimal outcome can only be implemented in the
contractible contracting game. To this end, let pc (t) equal zero for all t 2 T , that is, the rms sell
their products at a price of zero. The allocation (xc;pc;nc) obviously satises both (18) and (19)
hence, it is incentive compatible and individually rational. Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that
(xc;pc;nc) is indeed an equilibrium outcome of the contractible contracting game.
Suppose now that contracts are not contractible. Note that Principal 1 (2) can only make a
positive prot if the rst dimension of the buyers type is A (B). Therefore, the prot-maximizing
contract of Principal 1 (2) is the monopoly o¤er conditional on the rst dimension of the agents
type being A (B). Since H > 2L, Principal 1 (2) o¤ers the good a (b) at price H, and the agent
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buys the good only if his valuation is H. Hence, the unique equilibrium outcome is
(x (t) ;p (t) ;n (t)) =
8>><>>:
(a;H; 1) if t = (a;H) ;
(b;H; 2) if t = (b;H),
(0; 0; 0) otherwise.
This allocation is clearly ine¢ cient: an agent with valuation L leaves empty-handed despite the
fact that his willingness to pay exceeds the cost of production.
In the previous example, two rms produced di¤erent products and the demand for their
products came from di¤erent consumers. Therefore, in the ordinary contracting game, each rm
acts as a monopolist and generates a deadweight loss. If contracts are contractible, each rm can
promise a large payment to the consumer unless the other rm adopts competitive pricing. Of
course, the other rms best response is to set the competitive price. In this way, e¢ ciency can be
restored in the contractible contracting game. Note, however, that the e¢ cient equilibrium requires
that two rms engaging in very di¤erent activities to contract on each otherscontracts. This would
mean, for example, that a banks wage o¤er to a nancial analyst would depend explicitly on the
wage contract o¤ered to a general manager of a sport club. Such behavior seems both unrealistic
and absurd, at least from an applied point of view. Let us emphasize that Example 2 merely
illustrates the importance of the competitiveness assumption in the statement of Proposition 3.
6 Attributes of the Equilibrium Contracts
This section further investigates the attributes of the equilibrium contracts in both the ordinary
and the contractible contracting games.
6.1 Examples for Ordinary Contracting Games
For simplicity, we identify the message of an agent with its Gödel code in all the examples below.
That is, instead of saying that an agent sends a message whose Gödel code is q, we say that the
agent sends the message q. (This does not cause confusion because the encoding is a bijection.)
Next, we show, by examples, that one cannot assume that the equilibrium contracts specify a
single action for a principal as a function of the agents message. The contract dij is said to be
complete if jdij (q) j = 1 for all q, that is, dij is a function from N to Aij . Restricting the contracts
to be complete is with the loss of generality for two reasons. Example 3 shows that there are
allocations which cannot be supported with complete contracts, but can be supported otherwise.
Example 4 shows that there are allocations which can only be supported if contracts are required
to be complete.
Example 3. Suppose that n = 2 and k = 1. Assume that the agents type space is degenerate,
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A1 = A2 = fa; bg, and the payo¤s are dened by the following matrix:
a b
a 2, 2, 0 0, 3, 3
b 1, 0, 0 1, 0, 1
;
where the rst and second numbers in each cell describes the payo¤s to Principal 1 and Principal
2; and the third number is the payo¤ to the agent.
Notice that the agents payo¤ is zero whenever Principal 2 takes action a and positive otherwise.
Therefore, whenever he can send a message which triggers action b by Principal 2, he will do so.
In addition, given that Principal 2 takes action b, the agent prefers Principal 1 to take action a
over action b. Consider the allocation (a; a). Principal 2 would like to deviate and take action b.
Such a deviation can be punished by Principal 1 by taking action b. We show that the outcome
(a; a) can be implemented as an equilibrium but cannot be implemented with complete contracts.
Dene the equilibrium contracts of the principals as follows: d1 (q) = A1 for all q, and d2 (q) =
fag for all q. Since these contracts are constants in the messages of the agents, the strategy of the
agent is irrelevant. Principal 1s strategy is the following. If he observes that Principal 2 o¤ered
a contract which allows taking action b for some reports of the agent, he takes action b, otherwise
he takes action a. Obviously, none of the principals can increase his payo¤ by o¤ering a di¤erent
contract.
Next, we argue that (a; a) cannot be supported by complete contracts. Suppose that (d1; d2)
supports (a; a) and d1 is complete. Then, there exists an q 2 N such that d1 (q) = fag. Then
Principal 2 can protably deviate by o¤ering a contract which species action b independently of
the agents report. This is because the agent reports a q 2 N to Principal 1 such that d1 (q) = fag
and the outcome will be (a; b). This outcome maximizes the agents payo¤ and provides Principal
2 with a payo¤ higher than the outcome (a; a) would.
Example 4. Suppose n = 2 and k = 1. Assume that the agents type space is degenerate,
A1 = A2 = fH;Tg, and the payo¤s are dened by the following matrix:
H T
H 1, -1, -1 -1, 1, 1
T -1, 1, 1 1, -1, -1
;
where the rst and second numbers in each cell describe the payo¤s of Principal 1 and Principal
2; and the third number is the payo¤ to the agent. In this example, the two principals are playing
the Matching Pennies Game, and the agents payo¤ is identical to that of Principal 2.
We rst show that if each principal is restricted to o¤er a complete contract then the payo¤
prole ( 1; 1; 1) can be supported as an equilibrium payo¤ prole. To see this, consider the
following contract of Principal 2: d2 (1) = fHg and d2 (q) = fTg if q 6= 1. Suppose that the
complete contract of Principal 1 is d1. Notice that d1 (1) is either H or L. If d1 (1) = fHg then the
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agent can send messages 1 and 2 to Principals 1 and 2 respectively, which generates a payo¤ prole
( 1; 1; 1). Similarly, if d1 (1) = fLg, the agent can send the message 1 to both principals, which
again generates a payo¤ prole of ( 1; 1; 1). Therefore, no matter what the complete contract of
Principal 1 is, the agent can always induce the payo¤ prole ( 1; 1; 1).
Suppose now that the principals are not restricted to o¤er complete contracts. Then there does
not exist a pure strategy equilibrium in our game, because Principal 1 can always o¤er a contract
d, such that d (q) = fH;Lg. In addition, if we allow mixed strategies, the only equilibrium payo¤
prole was (1=2; 1=2; 1=2).
Next we show that one cannot assume that the message space of an agent is his type space.
To be more specic, the next example shows that the cardinality of the range of the equilibrium
contracts must be larger than the cardinality of the type space of the agent in order to implement
certain allocations.15
Example 5. Suppose that n = 2 and k = 1 and the type space of the agent is degenerate.
The principals are playing the Prisoners Dilemma. That is, A1 = A2 = fC;Dg, and the payo¤s
are dened by the following matrix
C D
C 2, 2, 3 0, 3, 1
D 3, 0, 1 1, 1, 2
:
Again, the rst two numbers are the payo¤s to the principals and the third one is the payo¤ to the
agent. Notice that the agent prefers the principals to cooperate to everything else, but prefers them
to defect to (C;D) and (D;C). The agent has no private information in this example. Hence, if
the action prole (C;C) could be implemented such that the message space of the agent is his type
space then (C;C) would be supported as an equilibrium outcome by contracts which do not depend
on the report of the agent. We show that this is impossible although (C;C) is implementable.
Suppose that d1 and d2 implement (C;C) and di (q1) = di (q2) for all q1; q2 2 N and i 2 f1; 2g.
If d1 (q) = fCg for all q, Principal 2 can protably deviate by o¤ering a contract that species
fDg. Hence, d1 (q) = d2 (q) = fC;Dg for all q; which implies that the principals play the Prisoners
Dilemma in the last stage of the game, and therefore, fC;Cg cannot be implemented.
Now, we show that we can implement fC;Cg with the help of the agent. Consider the following
contract
di (q) =
(
C if q = 1;
D if q 6= 1.
The strategy of the agent is dened such that he triggers (C;C) whenever he can. In particular, on
the equilibrium path, the agent reports 1 to each principal. The agent has no incentive to deviate
because his payo¤ is maximized. If one of the principals deviates and o¤ers a contract such that
the agent cannot induce the action C, the agent reports 2 to the other principal, and the outcome
would be fD;Dg.
15Similar results appear in Peck (1997), Martimort and Stole (2002), and Attar, Mariotti and Salanie (2011).
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6.2 Incompleteness of Contracts in the Contractible Contracting Games
Recall that Example 3 showed that contracts cannot be assumed to be complete in the ordinary
contracting game. The following example shows that this is true even if contracts are contractible.
Example 6. Suppose that n = 2 and k = 1. The action space of Principal 1 is fx; yg, and the
action space of Principal 2 is fa1; a2; sg. The type space of the agent is f1; 2g, and each type is
equally likely. The payo¤ of Principal 1 is constant zero. The following tables represent the payo¤s
to Principal 2 and to the agent, respectively:
t = 1 a1 a2 s
x 1; 1:1  3; 0:1 0; 1
y 0; 1  3; 0 1; 1
;
t = 2 a1 a2 s
x  3; 0 1; 1:1 0; 1
y  3; 0:1 0; 1 1; 1
First, we show that the constant allocation (x; s) can be implemented with incomplete contracts.
Then we show that the same allocation cannot be implemented with complete contracts.
In order to show that the outcome (x; s) is an equilibrium outcome, we have to verify the two
conditions of Theorem 1. The constant action prole (x; s) belongs to A because it is the unique
outcome in the subgame generated by (d1; d2), where d1 (n) = fxg and d2 (n) = fsg for all n. It
remains to show that the minmax value of Principal 2, dened by (9), is weakly smaller than zero.
In order to do so, consider the following contract of Principal 1: d1 (n) = fx; yg for all n 2 N. We
show that for all d2 2 D2, there is an equilibrium in the subgame G(d1;d2) such that the payo¤ of
Principal 2 is at most zero. We have to analyze four di¤erent cases depending on the range of d2.
Case 1. There exist n1 and n2 such that d2 (n1) = fa1g and d2 (n2) = fa2g. Dene the agents
strategy as follows: m21 (1) = n1, m
2
1 (2) = n2, and m
1
1  1. Principal 1s strategy is to take action
y. These strategies constitute an equilibrium in the subgame G(d1;d2) and result in a payo¤ of 0 to
Principal 2.
Case 2. There exists an n1 such that d2 (n1) = fa1g, but there does not exist n2 such that
d2 (n2) = fa2g. Dene the agents strategy such that m21  n1 and m11  1. Principal 2s strategy
is dened as follows. If s 2 d2
 
m21

, then he takes action s, otherwise he takes action a1. Principal
1 always takes action x. These strategies constitute an equilibrium in the subgame G(d1;d2) and
result in an expected payo¤ of minus two to Principal 2.
Case 3. There exists an n2 such that d2 (n2) = fa2g, but there does not exist any n1 such that
d2 (n1) = fa1g. Dene the agents strategy such that m21  n2 and m11  1. Principal 2s strategy
is dened as follows. If s 2 d2
 
m21

, then he takes s, otherwise he takes action a2. Principal 1
always takes action x. Again, these strategies constitute an equilibrium in the subgame G(d1;d2)
and result in an expected payo¤ of minus two to Principal 2.
Case 4. Suppose that there does not exist any ni such that d2 (ni) = faig for i = 1; 2. Dene
the agents strategy such that m21  n, if there exists an n such that d2 (n) = fa1; a2g. Otherwise,
m21  1. In addition, m11  1. Principal 2s strategy is dened as follows. If s 2 d2
 
m21

, then he
takes s, otherwise he takes action a2. Principal 1 always takes action x. These strategies constitute
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an equilibrium in the subgame G(d1;d2) and the payo¤ of Principal 2 is at most zero.
Now we show that (x; s) cannot be implemented with complete contracts. Suppose by contra-
diction that there is an equilibrium implementing (x; s), and Principal 1s contract is complete.
Let d21 denote the ordinary contract used by Principal 1 to punish deviations of Principal 2. (The
existence of such an ordinary contract is guaranteed by Proposition 1.) The contract d21 is complete
because Principal 1s equilibrium contract is complete. We have to consider two cases. Case 1:
There exists an n such that d21 (n) = fxg. Then, consider the following ordinary contract of Princi-
pal 2 : d2 (1) = fa1g and d2 (n) = fa2g if n 6= 1. According to Proposition 1, Principal 2 can induce
a subgame equivalent to G(d21;d2). Then the agent can generate the action prole (x; a1) if t = 1
and the action prole (x; a2) if t = 2. He can do so, for example, by using the reporting strategy
dened by m11  n, m21 (1) = 1 and m21 (2) = 2. Notice that these action proles are the unique
maximizers of the agents payo¤, hence he will generate this outcome in G(d21;d2). But this outcome
provides Principal 2 with a payo¤ of one, which is strictly larger then his payo¤ from (x; s), and
hence, the deviation generating G(d21;d2) is protable. Case 2: Suppose that d
2
1 (n) = fyg for all
n. Then Principal 2 can deviate and generate G(d21;d2) where d2 (n) = s for all n. The outcome of
this subgame is (y; s), which generates a payo¤ of one to Principal 2. Hence, Principal 2 can again
protably deviate.
7 Discussion
The goal of this paper was to understand the consequences of the contractibility of contracts in
common agency models. Our folk theorem shows that the contractibility of contracts leads to a
large set of equilibrium allocations. The interpretation of this theorem is that principals are able
to collude and implement various outcomes. At rst glance, this result might seem counterintuitive
because players do not interact repeatedly. In a repeated environment, a collusion can be sustained
because players can punish a deviator in periods followed by a deviation. In our model, the contract
of a principal reveals his intentions. Therefore, in some sense, the principals observe a deviation
even before a payo¤-relevant action is taken. Furthermore, since contracts are contractible, the
principals can commit to punish deviations, even if they would nd it suboptimal ex post.
One might ask why we chose to model the contract space with the set of denable correspon-
dences. Denability played two important roles in our analysis. First, the set of denable functions
contains cross-referential functions which were used to construct the equilibrium contracts in our
proofs. Second, identifying contracts with denable functions enabled us to pin down the min-
max values of the principals. In particular, the statement of Proposition 1 crucially depends on
denability.
There are other spaces which contain cross-referential objects. One such a space is, for example,
the set of Turing machines which is often used in game theoretic analysis. One can even think
about the programs in Tennenholtz (2004) as Turing machines, who used this space in a context
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similar to others. If we modelled the contracts by Turing machines, then the input would be the
descriptions of the machines and the messages. The output of each machine would be a subset of
a principals action space. It is easy to show that the if partof our main theorem holds with
such a contract space as well. That is, any allocation satisfying the two properties of Theorem 1
can be implemented as an equilibrium.16 The problem is with the only ifpart of the theorem,
and in particular, with the minmax values of the principals. The reason is that principals could
submit universal machines, which would simulate the machine of a deviator. Once the simulation
is completed, these machines could recommend an action prole which is worse for the deviator.
This action prole can depend on the result of the simulation, that is, on the actual deviation.
This suggests that the principals can push the payo¤ of a deviator below his minmax value. But of
course, a deviator could also submit a universal machine which would simulate the machines of the
others, and then best-respond to their outputs. The problem is that, in general, these universal
machines will not halt on each other. Indeed, it is not clear how one can properly dene the game
because of this halting problem.
On might argue that the Gödel coding is an unrealistic feature of our model. Indeed, we
do not observe contracts referring to the codes of other contracts. However, as we explained in
the introduction, the crucial assumption driving our results is that contracts must written in a
language. The Gödel coding itself is denable and hence, it can be embedded into a contract. In
fact, players do not even need to agree to use the same codes. They can use any coding unilaterally,
and the implications of the contract will be understood by the others, provided that they use the
same underlying language. Any language which is rich enough to express arithmetic statements,
for example English or Hungarian, does contain cross-referential statements. The set of texts seems
to be a natural description of the set of feasible contracts. In order to eliminate the possibility
of writing contracts which are cross-referential, one must make restrictions on the texts which are
admissible as contracts. It is not clear to us what these natural restrictions should be.
8 Appendix
8.1 Arithmetic Statements
Below, we provide a formal denitions for arithmetic statement and arithmetic statements with
free variables. We shall dene these objects for any rst-order logic and explain the specics of
Number Theory
Each formal language has a set of symbols. The symbols of a language are divided into two
disjoint sets: the logical-symbols, and the non-logic symbols. The logical-symbols include: (, ), 8,
9, :, =, and innitely many variable symbols, x0; x1; :::. The non-logic symbols include function-
symbols and relation-symbols.
16 In fact, any contract considered in our proof is a recursive function.
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Denition 6 t = hF;R; i is a similarity type, where F is a set of function-symbols, R is a set of
relation-symbols, and  : F [R! N [ f0g such that  (r) > 0 if r 2 R.
The function  determines the number of variables of the functions and the relations. If
 (f) = 0, then f is referred to as a constant-symbol.
One of the similarity type corresponding to the Peano Arithmetics, denoted by q = hF;R; i,
is: F = f0; 1+; g, R = f<g,  (0) =  (1) = 0,  (+) =  () =  (<) = 2. Notice that the zero
and the one are considered as functions with zero variable, that is, they are constant symbols. (We
point out that the similarity type of arithmetics can be dened without the relation <. This
relation can be then dened recursively.)
Denition 7 Let t = hF;R; i be a similarity type. Then the set of expressions of type t, denoted
by K (t), is the smallest set for which:
(i) x 2 K (t) for all variable symbols,
(ii) For all f 2 F , if  (f) = 0 then f 2 K (t),
(iii) For all f 2 F , if  (f) = n, and k1; :::; kn 2 K (t) then f (k1; :::; kn) 2 K (t).
Suppose that t = q. Then the following string of symbols are expressions in arithmetics: x, 0,
1, x+ 1, ((x+ 1)  (y + 1) + 1) etc.
We are ready to dene the set of statements corresponding to a similarity type.
Denition 8 Let t = hF;R; i be a similarity type. Then the set of statements of type t, denoted
by F (t), is the smallest set for which:
(i) if r 2 R;  (r) = n; and k1; :::; kn 2 K (t) then r (k1; :::; kn) 2 F (t),
(ii) if k1; k2 2 K (t) then k1 = k2 2 F (t)
(iii) if ;  2 F (t), then () _ () 2 F (t), : () 2 F (t), and 9x () 2 F (t).
The set of aritmetic statements are dened according to the previous denition with t = q.
Then the following string of symbols are statements in arithmetics: x = y, :9x9y (y = x+ 1), etc.
For each statement, one can enumerate the number of di¤erent variable symbols appearing in
the statement. A variable is called free variable in a statement if it does not appear right behind a
quantier. For example, the statement :9x9y ((y = x+ 1) _ (z = 1)) has three variable symbols:
x, y, and z. However, both the x and the y appears behind a quantier. Hence, the only free
variable of this statement is z.
8.2 Proofs
8.2.1 The Proof of Proposition 1
For all i, dq 2 Dq, and m =
 
mi;m i

dene
H
dq
i (m) =

dq
 
mi0;m i

: mi0 2 N	 .
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Notice that Hdqi (m)  2Aq . Now, consider Hq : Dq ! 2Aq 
Qk
i=1 2
2Aq dened as
Hq (dq) =
n
dq (m) ; H
dq
1 (m) ; :::;H
dq
k (m)

: m 2 Nk
o
.
Then we have
Lemma 2 Suppose that d, d0 2 D and Hq (dq) = H
 
d0q

for all q = 1; :::; n. Then Gd  Gd0 .
We are ready to prove Proposition 1. For all dq 2 Dq, dene
S (dq) =

d q : 9cq Hq
 
cq
 
[cq] ;

c q

= Hq (dq) ; Hq
 
c q
 
[cq] ;

c q

= Hq (d q)
	
.
By Lemma 2, it is enough to show that \dq2DqS (dq) 6= f;g. Let us assume by contradiction that
\dq2DqS (dq) = f;g .
Then there exists a function, F : H q (D q)! Hq (Dq), such that,
d q =2 S (dq) (21)
if F (H q (d q)) = Hq (dq). Now, dene a function g : Hq (Dq)! Dq, such that Hq (g (Hq (dq))) =
Hq (Dq). Furthermore, dene the function f : D q ! Dq, such that f (d q) = g (F (H q (d q))).
Notice that the domains of both F and g are nite, and hence, f is a denable function. In
addition,
d q =2 S (f (d q)) , (22)
by (21) and the denitions of F and g. Finally, we are ready to prove the proposition. Dene the
following contract for Principal q in one free variable:
cxq ([cq] ; [c q] ;m) = f

c q
h
< x >(x)
i
; [c q] ;m

,
for all m 2 Nk. Let  denote the Gödel code of this contract. Then
cq ([cq] ; [c q] ;m) = f
 
c q
 
cq

; [c q] ;m

. (23)
First, notice that
c q
 
cq

; [c q]
 2 S  cq  cq  ; c q (24)
by the denition of the set S. On the other hand, by (22),
c q
 
cq

; [c q]

=2 S  f  c q  cq  ; [c q] ;m :
This can be rewritten by (23) as
c q
 
cq

; [c q]

=2 S  cq ([cq] ; [c q]) :
But this contradicts to (24), and hence, \dq2DqS (dq) 6= f;g.
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8.2.2 Proof of Remark 2
Suppose that (d; ; ) implements an allocation in the ordinary contracting game. We construct
equilibrium strategies in the contractible contracting game which implements the same allocation.
Dene the contract for Principal j, cij 2 Cj , as follows: cij

([cq])
n
q=1 ;

mij

= dij
 
mij

for
all c 2 C and mij 2 L. In a subgame generated by the contract prole c, dene the second-stage
strategies of the agents as  (d (c) ; :), and the third stage strategies of the principals as  (d (c) ; :).
We must show that the players have no incentives to deviate. First, recall that the subgame
generated by c in the contractible contracting game is the same as the subgame generated by d (c)
in the ordinary contracting game. Since  and  were equilibrium strategies in the ordinary
contracting game, all players play a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in every subgame. We
only have to show that principals have no incentive to deviate at the contracting stage. Suppose
that Principal j o¤ers the contract cj instead of cj . This deviation results a subgame generated by 
cj
 
[cj ] ;

c j

; d j

. Notice that Principal j could generate the same subgame in the ordinary
contracting game by o¤ering cij
 
[cj ] ;

c j

; :

for all i = 1; :::; k. Since this deviation was not prof-
itable in the ordinary contracting game, o¤ering cj is not protable in the contractible contracting
game.
8.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
By Theorem 1, we only have to show that EtUj (t) = uj for all j. Consider rst the following
ordinary contract of Principal q (q 6= j) o¤ered to Agent i:
ediq (l) = aiq;j	 for all l 2 N.
Suppose that Principal q o¤ers edq = ed1q; :::; edkq for all q (6= j). Then Principal q (6= j) ends up
taking action aq;j regardless of what the messages of the agents and the contract of Principal j.
Therefore, by part (ii) of Assumption 1, the expected payo¤ of Principal j is at most Uj (t) in every
subgame G(dj ;ed j). Hence, EtUj (t)  uj .
Now, consider the following contract of Principal j o¤ered to Agent i:
edij (l) = fajg for all l 2 N.
Suppose that Principal j o¤ers edj = ed1j ; :::; edkj. Then Principal j ends up taking action aj no
matter what the messages of the agents and the contracts of the other Principals are. Therefore,
by part (i) of Assumption 1, the expected payo¤ of Principal j is at least Uj (t) in every subgame
G(edj ;d j). Hence, EtUj (t)  uj .
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Since information is complete, every allocation is strongly incentive compatible. By Theorem 1,
we only have to show that uj = uj . Notice that Principal j can o¤er the contract d
i
j to Agent i,
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such that dij (l) = A
i
j for all l 2 N. This means that no matter what the messages of the agents
are, Principal j can take any of his actions in the subgame generated by the contracts. Therefore,
Principal j can best-respond to the action prole of the other principals and can achieve a value of
at least uj . This shows that uj  uj . In order to prove that uj  uj , let a j;j = (aq;j)q 6=j 2 A j be
a solution to mina j maxaj uj (aj ; a j). Dene Principal qs contract to Agent i, d
i
q, as d
i
q (l) = aq;j
for all l 2 N. That is, no matter what the messages of the agents are, the principals other than j
will take action a j;j . Of course, Principal j can achieve at most uj , hence, uj  uj .
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